Context card
Containing an AI agent: pause, revoke, isolate, shut down
How do you stop an AI agent that has crossed its boundary — without making things worse, and without confusing it with stopping a machine?
The short answer
Containment is a ladder of four rungs that act from outside the agent: pause the task, revoke its credentials, isolate its tools and connected systems, shut it down. The lowest rung that stops the harm is chosen, and the evidence is secured first. Containing an agent never replaces the stopping functions of a machine: a robot, a line or a process is brought to a safe state by its own control system.
For: Technical project managers, operations teams, documentation systems developers and technical writers who write runbooks
Key points
- Containment acts from outside the agent; a stop the agent can ignore is no stop.
- Four rungs: pause, revoke, isolate, shut down — choose the lowest one that stops the harm.
- Contain the effects too: queued updates, open transactions and running orders keep acting.
- Secure the traces and affected records before anyone cleans up.
- An agent stop is not an emergency stop; the AI Act’s stop procedure and machine safety exist side by side.
The context
The ladder
- Pause the task or the agent — no new steps, the state is kept.
- Revoke its credentials: tokens, keys, sessions. With a separate agent identity, the people it worked for keep their access.
- Isolate its tools and connected systems: disconnect a connector, set an interface to manual, halt a queue, quarantine a device group, cut the conduit into OT.
- Shut down the agent or the agent platform.
An agent kill switch bundles rungs 1 to 3 for one agent, a group or all agents. Every rung must be tested before it is needed, and every use is recorded. The blast radius tells you how fast you have to climb.
Contain the effects, not only the agent
| System type | Effects that keep acting | Containment of the effect |
|---|---|---|
| IT | Open transactions, queued mails, running pipelines | Freeze queues, hold the pipeline, block the connector |
| IoT | Rollout waves, scheduled commands | Halt the rollout queue, isolate the device group at the gateway or in the device cloud |
| OT | Written setpoints and recipes, running batches | Close the conduit, fall back to operator control, check the values against the released ones |
| Machines | Changed programmes and parameters, orders to fleet managers | Stop sending orders; the machine or vehicle finishes or stops under its own control |
Agent stop vs. emergency stop
The AI Act requires that people overseeing a high-risk AI system can interrupt it through a “stop” button or a similar procedure that brings it to a halt in a safe state (Art. 14(4)(e)). That stop concerns the AI system. An emergency stop is a safety function of a machine, designed and validated under machinery law, and the machine’s safe state is reached by its own control and safety systems — for example with a controlled stop. Where an agent works with a robot cell, an AMR fleet or a line, both exist side by side: the agent stop never replaces the emergency stop, and the emergency stop never depends on the agent.
Who decides
Name in advance who may take which rung, and how quickly — rung 1 often the operator of the agent, rung 4 the owner of the platform. In OT, cutting the conduit is agreed with the plant’s operations, because the process must stay controlled without the agent.
The whole picture is on the pathway map on AI agents crossing the line.
Questions readers ask next
- Why not shut everything down at once?
- Because shutting down costs operation and can destroy evidence or leave half-finished transactions. The lowest rung that stops the harm is usually faster and keeps the state you need for restoration.
- Can a containment step create a hazard?
- In OT and on machines, yes, if cutting an agent off leaves a process without control. That is why the process must always be controllable without the agent, and why containment is planned with the plant’s operations.
- Is the AI Act’s stop button an emergency stop?
- No. Article 14(4)(e) concerns interrupting a high-risk AI system. Emergency stops of machines are governed by machinery law and standards such as ISO 13850.
Sources
- NIST SP 800-61 Rev. 3: Incident Response Recommendations and Considerations for Cybersecurity Risk Management — NIST, 3 April 2025
- OWASP Top 10 for Agentic Applications for 2026 — OWASP GenAI Security Project, 9 December 2025
- Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 (Artificial Intelligence Act) — EUR-Lex, 12 July 2024
- Regulation (EU) 2023/1230 (Machinery Regulation) — EUR-Lex, 29 June 2023
- RFC 7009: OAuth 2.0 Token Revocation — IETF, August 2013
Review log and changes
Every context card is checked against its sources before it is published, and again whenever it changes; the date under the byline is the last review. Corrections (something was wrong) and additions (something was missing) are logged below with date and time (Berlin time). Typos, formatting and link fixes are not listed.
Reviewed
No corrections or additions since publication.