The art of thinking · Mind and moral status
Biological naturalism
Also known as: Searle's biological naturalism
German: Biologischer Naturalismus
In philosophy of mind, biological naturalism is John Searle's position that consciousness is a real biological phenomenon caused by processes in the brain, so that running a computer program, however sophisticated, is not by itself sufficient for consciousness.
- Thinking models
- Philosophy
- Philosophy of mind
In one sentence
Biological naturalism, after John Searle, holds that consciousness is caused by brain processes and that running a program is not sufficient for it.
Example
Searle's Chinese room: a person who follows a rule book to answer Chinese questions produces fitting answers without understanding Chinese, which Searle takes to show that symbol manipulation is not understanding.
Explained in context
Context cards connect this term with others to answer one question. Also in British English and German.
How it applies
- Searle's two claims: Mental phenomena are caused by neurobiological processes, and they are features of the brain, not something beyond nature. From this Searle concludes that a program is defined by syntax alone and that syntax is not sufficient for meaning or consciousness, which is what the Chinese room argument (1980) is meant to show.
- Related positions today: Substrate and embodiment accounts, for example Anil Seth's view that consciousness is tied to the regulation of a living body, also doubt that computation alone is enough. They are not all identical to Searle's position and should be named individually.
- A position, not a result: Biological naturalism does not prove that AI systems cannot be conscious; it states what consciousness would need. Like computational functionalism, it is a premise that current evidence does not settle.
- In documentation and policy texts: Attribute the view to its proponents and keep it apart from evaluation results and from what a model says about itself.
Biological naturalism vs. computational functionalism
Biological naturalism ties consciousness to the causal powers of biological processes; computational functionalism ties it to the right computation in any substrate. The first makes current AI architectures unlikely candidates by premise, the second makes architecture the deciding question.
External references
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